tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post115990874861480114..comments2024-01-16T23:37:25.814+11:00Comments on Knowability: The Most General Factive Mental State OperatorJoe Salernohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15060173423563404276noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1164694898961393702006-11-28T17:21:00.000+11:002006-11-28T17:21:00.000+11:00I'll buy that. I think there are factive and a no...I'll buy that. I think there are factive and a non-factive readings of 'doesnt know'. If that's right, then the former may be unanalyzable, while the latter is the truth functional denial of 'it is known that'.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1164630684348931292006-11-27T23:31:00.000+11:002006-11-27T23:31:00.000+11:00Another try for cancellation:Suppose Ann and Ben a...Another try for cancellation:<BR/><BR/>Suppose Ann and Ben and Carl play a game: One makes a claim, the others have to come up with a claim that is entailed by it. Whoever is first, wins. Carl claims: It is false that p. Ann, having just finished her first lesson in epistemology, wins with the claim: Ben does not know that p. Here, I think, the context cancels the truth-presumption.<BR/><BR/>S.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1164349522938106872006-11-24T17:25:00.000+11:002006-11-24T17:25:00.000+11:00That is a good explanation. It would explain the ...That is a good explanation. It would explain the presumption of truth. But then we should be able to cancel the implicature with a claim like, "Harold doesn't know that his wife is dead, but she isn't dead." The claim sounds deviant. And so, the presumption of truth is not canceled. 'does not know' passes the semantic test.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1164232855802735162006-11-23T09:00:00.000+11:002006-11-23T09:00:00.000+11:00As for the possibility of a Gricean explanation of...As for the possibility of a Gricean explanation of the presumption of truth in the 'does not know' case. Maybe something like this is not entirely implausible:<BR/><BR/>Since 'it is false that p' is stronger than and trivially entails that 'John does not know that p' (how could he? it's false!), uttering the latter sentence while the former is known/believed to be true arguably violates the quantity principle. You're less informative than you could be with respect to conversationally relevant facts.<BR/><BR/>S.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160768705077827802006-10-14T05:45:00.000+10:002006-10-14T05:45:00.000+10:00Joe,You say that ‘could have known that’ has two r...Joe,<BR/><BR/>You say that ‘could have known that’ has two readings: a factive and a non-factive reading. The non-factive reading, you say, “is that it is merely possible that s knows that p.” On the factive reading, you say the presumption of truth is not cancelable because it implies s was ‘in a position’ to know that p. <BR/><BR/>I suppose I’m not sure why being in a position to know that p implies p. Suppose I observe a man fall off a very high bridge. It is nearly impossible that a man who falls off this bridge will survive the fall. Accordingly, I believe this man is dead. Now, supposing the man survives, it seems that my epistemic position is such that, had he died, my belief that he had died would have qualified as knowledge. Accordingly, it seems I ‘could have known that’ he died in the sense that I was ‘in a position to know’ that he died. The only reason I didn’t know he died was the fact that he didn’t die. In other words, it seems there are two ways to be in a position to know p while not knowing p: (i) p is true, and the only thing s needs in order to know p is the belief that p; or (ii) s (rationally) believes p while p is false; had p been true, s would have known p. In both (i) and (ii), it seems s is in a position to know p, but fails to know p. <BR/><BR/>Now, you want to say a subject can only be in a position to know p in the sense of (i). I think you need to argue for this. As it stands, it seems equally reasonable for a person to say a subject is in a position to know p in either of the senses I’ve just outlined ((i) or (ii)). Accordingly, it seems that you haven’t offered an account of ‘could have known that’ that is factive.<BR/><BR/>Regards,<BR/>JohnAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160152180759674592006-10-07T02:29:00.000+10:002006-10-07T02:29:00.000+10:00Thanks Julien and Jeremy. My point about uncancel...Thanks Julien and Jeremy. My point about uncancellability was meant to be evidence against the implicature option. But I think there is a worry here nevertheless. I'm claiming that 'does not know' is ambiguous between a factive and a non-factive reading. The other possibility is that there is no ambiguity and that the apparent factivity can be explained by implicature. I believe that there is some worry about how effective an uncancellability argument can be when there is a presumption of ambiguity. However, I think the onus is on who thinks that there is an implicature. Which Gricean principles explain the presumption of truth in 'does not know'? Moreover, notice it is not enough to tell a Gricean story. One must also give reason for thinking the Gricean account is more plausible than the semantic account.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160077653745649962006-10-06T05:47:00.000+10:002006-10-06T05:47:00.000+10:00Hi Julien,I took Joe's point about uncancellabilit...Hi Julien,<BR/><BR/>I took Joe's point about uncancellability to be evidence against the implicature option. But I shouldn't speak for Joe, here.<BR/><BR/>-JeremyAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160069518843012282006-10-06T03:31:00.000+10:002006-10-06T03:31:00.000+10:00Thanks much, Joe. Perhaps "he doesn't know that hi...Thanks much, Joe. <BR/><BR/>Perhaps "he doesn't know that his wife died in the plane crash" in fact shorthand for "his wife died in the plane crash, but he doesn't know it". <BR/><BR/>Carrie (Jenkins) made this point to me, in St Andrews. One should perhaps rule out conversational implicature hypotheses before claiming that some instances of the relevant expressions are factive. <BR/><BR/>As far as 'not-Kp' is concerned, I think I would opt for the implicature option. But I still don't know what to think about knowability itself. Your examples seem compelling. <BR/><BR/>Best,<BR/><BR/>JAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160062946992035702006-10-06T01:42:00.000+10:002006-10-06T01:42:00.000+10:00Consider, "He doesn't know that his wife died in t...Consider, <BR/><BR/>"He doesn't know that his wife died in the plane crash."<BR/><BR/>The presumption of truth here is not cancelable. Evidence for this is the fact that the following is deviant: <BR/><BR/>"He doesn't know that his wife died in the plane crash. However, his wife is alive and well."Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1160043401332076442006-10-05T20:16:00.000+10:002006-10-05T20:16:00.000+10:00This is thoughtful and provoking. For now, just a ...This is thoughtful and provoking. For now, just a question of clarification, if I may.<BR/><BR/>"More carefully, 'could have known that' and 'does not know that' both have a factive and a non-factive reading."<BR/><BR/>I can't see the factive reading of not-Kp, right now. Am I missing something?<BR/><BR/>Best,<BR/><BR/>JAnonymousnoreply@blogger.com