tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post116499087061240804..comments2024-01-16T23:37:25.814+11:00Comments on Knowability: Defeating Perceptual and Theistic Knowledge (Frances)Joe Salernohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15060173423563404276noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165176741923886532006-12-04T07:12:00.000+11:002006-12-04T07:12:00.000+11:00Micah,I don't know how either of your comments hav...Micah,<BR/><BR/>I don't know how either of your comments have relevance to the argument. Brain scientists have no part in the story, so I don't see how they matter. And suppose someone didn't share your theory of color?Bryan Franceshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01514217081239153421noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165093775490381232006-12-03T08:09:00.000+11:002006-12-03T08:09:00.000+11:00Trent,Really? In the envisioned scenario you thin...Trent,<BR/><BR/>Really? In the envisioned scenario you think the person could just say 'I think you guys are all wrong or trying to fool me. I'm sticking with my belief that these socks are blue'?<BR/><BR/>I can see the person being perfectly upstanding in refusing to go along with the color scientist and her husband. That is, we need not believe that the socks are trick socks and are really green. I think it is epistemically permissible to believe them, but there is nothing blameworthy in not agreeing with them.<BR/><BR/>But to stick to one's belief that the socks are blue strikes me as a classic case of pigheadedness. One should, I submit, withhold belief.<BR/><BR/>Keep in mind that the person in question knows about fancy color illusions, materials, and the like. And he knows that the woman really is a color scientist, as are her assistants, etc. And they don't fool around, lie, deceive, etc.<BR/><BR/>I can see objecting to the socks-spirituality premise, but I thought the socks premise was pretty solid!Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165092781744824632006-12-03T07:53:00.000+11:002006-12-03T07:53:00.000+11:00Right, I don't think the trick-socks story is craz...Right, I don't think the trick-socks story is crazy, but it's pretty odd and I think someone could be well within their epistemic rights to assign it a low enough prior probability that one on balance trusts one's perceptual evidence. <BR/><BR/>I think the only function of the trait of being "philosophy crap" for Moore is that it's one of many reasons for assigning a low prior to the skeptical hypothesis. In the socks case it's a different reason, but they end up probabilistically structurally similar enough.<BR/><BR/>The trick-socks story is less outlandish than the BIV story and no doubt we can march down a series of cases where it becomes unclear whether one could be within one's epistemic rights to continue on one's doxastic course (on the other side of which there will be clear cases of defeated belief), but "hard cases make bad law". <BR/><BR/>(sorry about deleting the previous, but I made a terrible spelling error (I hope there are no more))Trent_Doughertyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18270546251187099646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165092653807156822006-12-03T07:50:00.000+11:002006-12-03T07:50:00.000+11:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Trent_Doughertyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18270546251187099646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165050049848741262006-12-02T20:00:00.000+11:002006-12-02T20:00:00.000+11:00Hi Trent,I'm not sure what you're saying. It appe...Hi Trent,<BR/><BR/>I'm not sure what you're saying. It appears to me that you're saying that in the trick socks story the person is not epistemically blameworthy in continuing to hold that the socks are blue even though the scientists say that although of course they look blue and totally normal, they are really green because of such-and-such scientific reasons.<BR/><BR/>Is that accurate? If so, then I think you're mistaken. The case is designed in such a way that the "alternative" explanation (the socks are really green, etc.) is not at all "crazy". The example derives its entire force from that feature!<BR/><BR/>Suppose there were not one but two alternative explanations offered: the scientific one I described and a brain-in-a-vat one. A nutcase says that your blue socks belief is false because you have no socks on at all, as you're a brain in a vat. I'm assuming that you're not blameworthy in continuing with your blue socks belief even after digesting the nutcase's alternative explanation.<BR/><BR/>But matters are otherwise with the alternative scientific explanation. It's also importantly different from Conee's rain-machine story, at least how Conee develops it. In the latter, professor Jones tries to fool his colleague Smith into thinking it's not raining: really, Jones says, the water falling outside the window is due to a rain machine being used in a movie. In order to make the cases analogous, we need to assume that both professors know that lots of films have been shot lately on that part of campus, Jones is a director (say) in many of those films, they have used rain machines before on that very campus, Jones gets someone else to back up the rain machine story, etc. Now the socks and rain cases are analogous: in both cases legitimate experts are telling you your belief is wrong, and they are drawing on their legitimate expert knowledge in doing so.<BR/><BR/>Now you tell me: if Smith sticks with his 'It is real rain out there' belief, is he epistemically blameworthy in doing so? For my money, Smith is blameworthy. It seems to me that the Moorean move is hopeless here, and there is no reason I know of for thinking Moore would disagree! After all, the alternative explanation being offered isn't based on anything like a purely philosophical argument.<BR/><BR/>Now you might agree with my charge of blameworthiness for the socks case but object that the theistic case is different. But let's move one step at a time.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165034605735326942006-12-02T15:43:00.000+11:002006-12-02T15:43:00.000+11:00Bryan, you say that in the set up "one encounters ...Bryan, you say that in the set up "one encounters the alternative explanations and can do nothing to suggest that they’re wrong."<BR/><BR/>I'm not sure what kinds of doings you have in mind here, but it doesn't seem to me that one needs to "do" anything to maintain epistemically upstanding belief so long as one has justifiedly adopted a sufficiently low prior probability to such crazy scenarios (and I think it plausible that such justified attitudes are not too hard to come by). In general, it just seems to be a matter of one's credences taking the path of least resistance. Which seems more credible to one: the perceptual experience and its track record, say, or the crazy-sounding story (or in the God case, the quasi-perceptual experience, or the force of, say, the problem of evil (this would be related to the first horn of Joe's dilemma)). <BR/><BR/>Also, you say you don't like the response that "Well, the trick-socks explanation being offered by the color scientists must be wrong, as I already know from visual perception that the socks are blue." That sounds like the Problem of Easy Knowledge to me and I think that's a separate issue, but I do think a broadly Moorean response is plausible to this and other such skeptical scenarios: I'm more confident that I know things by direct perceptual experience than I am that such special (alleged) defeaters take away my knowledge. Again, it seems a matter of "doxastic flow". <BR/><BR/>Now I don't mean to suggest that all subjective probabilities are created equal, I'm not an orthodox bayesian personalist, but I think in both the cases you give, there's room for reasonable disagreement (not in the sense that there are two attitudes which fit the same evidence, but rather that properly functioning cognitive agents can be subject to different epistemic seeming states under the same circumstances and so have different evidence to begin with). <BR/><BR/>I think, unsurprisingly, some of these issues are effectively addressed in Conee 1999, "Heeding Misleading Evidence." (indeed, Bryan's sock story is structurally similar to Earl's rain-maker story). The key move which I make use of above is that basic evidence consists in non-doxastic states, seeming states in particular (see also his "First things First" in the Evidentialism book).Trent_Doughertyhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/18270546251187099646noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165006726249484342006-12-02T07:58:00.000+11:002006-12-02T07:58:00.000+11:00Thanks for the comment, Joe.Part of what I find in...Thanks for the comment, Joe.<BR/><BR/>Part of what I find interesting about the trick socks story is that the initial knowledge is about as good as knowledge ever gets. Of course, some people say that no socks are any color. But I'm setting that issue aside here.<BR/><BR/>Philosophers sometimes say that spiritual experience or perception has VERY good epistemic credentials. So, contrary evidence doesn't diminish the warrant had by the theistic belief enough so that the theistic belief counts as blameworthy. A rough model: my spiritual experience or perception of God provides my belief that God exists with 2000 warrant units. Considerations regarding the problem of evil or hiddenness of God, for instance, will provide "negative" warrant units. The number will depend on the arguments/evidence, my appreciation of them, etc. But, it might be thought, they'll only produce around 500 negative warrant units. Since I need just 1000 warrant units for an epistemically non-blameworthy belief (say), I'm still epistemically okay in retaining my theistic belief even when in full awareness of alternative intelligent, well-thought out, etc. explanations of the spiritual experiences.<BR/><BR/>Of course, we can make the point without the model!<BR/><BR/>But the trick socks story suggests, at least a bit, that defense of theistic belief is too optimistic.Bryan Franceshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01514217081239153421noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-1165004958548736882006-12-02T07:29:00.000+11:002006-12-02T07:29:00.000+11:00With respect to defeaters, I'll assume that theist...With respect to defeaters, I'll assume that theistic knowledge (through quasi-perceptual religious experience) should be held to the same standard as knowledge more generally. Then Bryan's argument seems to be this.<BR/><BR/><BR/>1. If s knows that P, then s is not aware of any plausible (even if misleading) defeaters to P.<BR/><BR/>After all, knowers are epistemically responsible.<BR/><BR/>2. Theistic belief (through religious experience) has plausible (but ex hypothesi) misleading defeaters.<BR/><BR/>So,<BR/><BR/>3. as a matter of fact, nobody aware of the misleading defeating evidence has knowledge of the existence of God through religious experience.<BR/><BR/>A fortiori, even those who by reliable mechanisms see correctly that God exists are epistemically blameworthy and fail to know that God exists.<BR/><BR/>In conclusion, a defense of this sort of theistic knowledge (for defeater-aware subjects) requires an independent argument against premise 1.<BR/><BR/>Notice that that argument can be strengthened. The theist must argue that weaker forms of Premise 1 are false as well. Traditionally knowledge fails if there is true, plausible, misleading, defeating information for which the subject is <I>unaware</I>. (See the familiar Tom Grabit and assassinated-leader-with-false-newspaper-story examples). So, unsurprisingly, even theists who correctly see God but ignore epistemic criticism would fail to know. Moreover, it is traditionally thought that knowledge fails when there is true, misleading, defeating information that is <I>implausible</I>, even if the subject is unaware of it. (See infamous Barncounty example). However, it seems less appropriate to call such subjects blameworthy. Nevertheless, it would follow that theists who correctly see God but are unaware of crazy but true counterevidence, fail to know.<BR/><BR/>There seem to be two options for the possibility of theistic knowledge. Argue against the lore about defeaters, or argue that quasi-perceptual religious knowledge is sui generis.Anonymousnoreply@blogger.com