tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post3162170267316317735..comments2024-01-16T23:37:25.814+11:00Comments on Knowability: Most Counterfactuals are FalseJoe Salernohttp://www.blogger.com/profile/15060173423563404276noreply@blogger.comBlogger3125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-37858518820840242952007-09-02T02:07:00.000+10:002007-09-02T02:07:00.000+10:00There's also the disanalogy with epistemic context...There's also the disanalogy with epistemic contextualism since there is no subject to which we are attributing an attitude. <BR/><BR/>That said, there may be an analogous objection to counterfactual contextualist that goes like this:<BR/><BR/>(Caesar) <BR/>A: If Caesar had commanded the Korean War he would have used nukes. After all, he was exceedingly ruthless. <BR/>B: That may be right, but Caesar lived long before nukes. So it's false that he would have used nukes. Rather, he would have used catapults. <BR/>A: I agree, but what I said earlier still stands!<BR/><BR/>If the truth values of counterfactuals vary with context, then dialogs like the one's above should not violate our semantic intuitions. I don't know how semantically violated I feel about the above dialog. My ears aren't ringing. Perhaps the following is closer to a Stanley-like objection. <BR/><BR/>A: [uttered in ordinary circumstances]<BR/>If I were to jump up, I would come down.<BR/>B: However, there is a non-zero probability of a strong gust of wind suspending you in mid-air. Hence, you might not come down, and so, it's false that you would come down. <BR/>A: I agree, but what I just said remains true. <BR/><BR/>I'm not entirely comfortable with this dialog. Will think more about it.Joe Salernohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15060173423563404276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-90254361652811529022007-09-02T01:36:00.000+10:002007-09-02T01:36:00.000+10:00Hi Julien. This sounds like the analogue of a Jas...Hi Julien. This sounds like the analogue of a Jason Stanley criticism of contextualism about knowledge. However, i'm not sure "epistemic standards" are what shifts with contexts in the case of counterfactuals. Rather the context shifts which background facts are relevant for the proper evaluation of the consequent given the antecedent.Joe Salernohttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15060173423563404276noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-31040582.post-70462085858452082182007-09-01T19:31:00.000+10:002007-09-01T19:31:00.000+10:00Hé Joe, just a quick question. How to evaluate cro...Hé Joe, just a quick question. How to evaluate cross-contextual assessments of might-counterfactual claims? Suppose C1 is a high standards context and C2 is a low standards one. And suppose Hi says, in C1 "A <>--> not-B". Then, it would seem that Lo, in C2, might reply: "What you said (in C1) is true, but, actually, not-(A <>--> not-B)". This doesn't sound intuitively right, however. What do you think?Julienhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10145885350564771431noreply@blogger.com